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The	Catalan	and	Spanish	crisis:	A	European
perspective
The	Catalan	independence	question	remains	one	of	the	key	issues	on	the	agenda	for	Spain’s	new
Prime	Minister,	Pedro	Sánchez,	as	he	completes	his	first	month	in	office.	Sebastian	Balfour	writes	that
Sánchez	is	likely	to	carry	out	a	holding	operation	in	the	hope	that	support	for	his	Socialists	will	grow
ahead	of	the	next	general	election,	while	the	Catalan	coalition	government	is	bound	by	some	of	its
parliamentary	partners	to	continue	pursuing	independence.
It	is	perhaps	an	appropriate	moment	to	reflect	on	the	crisis	in	Spain	and	Catalonia,	as	new	governments	establish
themselves	in	Madrid	and	Barcelona	claiming	to	seek	new	ways	of	solving	the	Catalan	dilemma.
It	has	been	a	momentous	period	since	the	‘illegal’	October	referendum,	the	unilateral	declaration	of	independence
and	the	imposition	of	direct	rule	from	Madrid.	Much	of	the	debate	has	focused	on	the	Catalan	issue	and	has	solidified
into	almost	tribal	identities,	provoking	rifts	among	friends,	families	and	work	colleagues.	Yet	causes	and	potential
solutions	are	more	complex	and	cross-cutting	than	can	be	gathered	from	the	rhetoric	on	both	sides.	And	the	crisis	is
not	merely	about	the	relationship	between	two	antagonistic	national	projects.	It	is	part	of	a	much	broader	process
triggered	by	socio-economic	crisis,	austerity,	and	globalisation	whose	ramifications	extend	to	Europe	as	a	whole.
To	begin	with,	the	crisis	has	exposed	and	exacerbated	structural	faults	in	the	functioning	of	the	Spanish	state.	The
most	immediate	problem	is	the	architecture	of	the	state.	The	territorial	system	of	regional	autonomy	arising	from	the
democratic	settlement	of	1978	was	meant	to	balance	diversity	with	solidarity.	It	was	one	in	which	some	were	more
equal	than	others,	and	it	soon	gave	rise	to	competition	and	comparative	grievance.	It	was	also	seen	as	an	affront	to
many	Catalans	and	Basques	because	it	diluted	historical	precedent	as	well	as	their	sense	of	identity	and	cultural
separateness.
Yet	successive	Spanish	governments,	in	particular	the	Partido	Popular	government	of	2011-18,	sought	to	level	off
the	distinctive	powers	enjoyed	by	the	four	‘historic’	regions	in	order	to	carry	out	a	discreet	policy	of	re-centralisation.
Since	then,	the	sense	of	alienation	among	Catalan	and	Basque	nationalists	towards	the	Spanish	state	has	deepened
to	the	extent	that	several	million	Basque	and	Catalan	citizens	no	longer	feel	part	of	Spain.	Attempts	by	their
respective	autonomous	governments	to	renegotiate	a	new	status,	as	an	associated	nation	or	a	nation	within	a
multinational	state,	have	been	quashed	by	the	legal	apparatus	of	the	Spanish	state.
The	actions	of	the	judiciary	have	exposed	another	dysfunctional	feature	of	the	Spanish	state,	the	increasing
politicisation	of	the	legal	system.	Since	2013,	the	Council	of	Europe	has	repeatedly	drawn	attention	to	the	lack	of
impartiality	of	the	justice	system	in	Spain.	In	fact	many	of	Spain’s	various	judicial	bodies	are	made	up	of	judges
chosen	by	political	parties.	The	conservative	bias	was	particularly	clear	in	the	ruling	by	the	Constitutional	Tribunal	in
2010	that	many	articles	of	Catalonia’s	new	democratically	approved	Statute	of	Autonomy	were	unconstitutional.
Moreover,	some	of	the	criminal	charges	levelled	at	Catalan	ex-ministers	since	October,	such	as	sedition	and
rebellion,	have	no	match	in	most	legal	systems	elsewhere	in	Europe,	hence	the	difficulty	Spain	has	experienced	in
seeking	to	extradite	Catalan	politicians	in	exile.
The	problem	was	intensified	in	the	Catalan	case	by	a	sense	of	economic	injustice.	With	only	16%	of	the	Spanish
population,	Catalonia	provides	21%	of	the	national	tax	revenue.	The	region	receives	only	66%	of	the	average	of	state
funding	across	Spain	and	it	has	obtained	a	mere	8%	of	state	investment	in	infrastructure.	A	popular	view	is	that
Catalonia	is	paying	much	more	than	its	fair	share	towards	the	rest	of	Spain	and	that	national	policy	under	both
Socialist	and	Conservative	governments	discriminated	against	the	region.
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An	even	more	important	cause	of	the	rise	of	a	powerful	independence	movement	was	the	economic	recession	of
2008.	The	return	to	power	of	the	conservatives	in	2011	coincided	with	the	emergence	of	the	popular	protest
movement,	the	15th	of	May	movement,	against	the	effects	of	the	recession	and	the	policies	of	austerity.	Alongside
these	nationwide	indignados,	the	Catalanist	popular	movement	emerged,	the	Assemblea	Nacional	Catalana,	calling
for	independence	as	the	solution	to	both	the	crisis	and	the	accumulated	grievances	of	Catalans.	While	the	15	May
movement	appealed	to	class,	the	Assemblea	appealed	to	identity,	diverting	socio-economic	grievances	into	the
politics	of	nationalism.	Both	movements	built	on	the	strong	associational	life	in	Catalonia	where	there	were	at	least
48,000	associations	of	one	kind	or	another	in	a	region	of	7.5	million	people.
The	Assemblea	was	particularly	successful.	With	a	small	army	of	volunteers	skilled	in	social	media,	it	managed	to
capture	the	imagination	of	many	Catalans.	In	any	case	identity	is	easier	to	mobilise	than	class,	even	more	so	if	it	is
accompanied	by	a	powerful	historical	narrative	of	victimisation.	Behind	this	growth	lay	long-term	structural	factors
such	as	the	changing	class	structure	in	an	economy	that	was	fast	de-industrialising	so	that	the	old	industrial	belt
around	the	big	cities	like	Barcelona	was	turning	to	service	industries,	many	involving	overseas	immigrants.	The
process	was	therefore	weakening	the	dual	identities	which	these	communities	had	once	represented.
The	balance	of	political	power	in	Catalonia	lay	with	the	nationalist	centre-right,	which	had	dominated	Catalan
government	in	the	new	democracy	for	all	but	seven	years.	Independence	had	never	been	an	explicit	part	of	its
agenda.	But	by	2012,	driven	perhaps	by	the	fear	of	losing	electoral	support	to	these	new	movements	and	frustrated
by	the	Constitutional	Tribunal’s	reversal	of	key	aspects	of	the	new	Statute	for	Catalan	autonomy,	the	nationalist
centre-right	jumped	on	the	bandwagon	of	the	separatist	cause.
By	2015	a	separatist	coalition	had	been	formed	bringing	together	a	wide	spectrum	of	political	parties,	from	the	anti-
capitalist	nationalist	left	to	the	nationalist	centre-right,	whose	only	common	cause	was	independence.	Hence	no
programme	for	an	independent	Catalonia	has	ever	been	fully	articulated.	Another	of	its	contradictions	was	that	some
of	the	conservative	nationalist	elites	associated	with	the	coalition	had	been	guilty	of	corruption	and	of	policies	of
austerity	and	privatisation,	key	issues	in	the	separatist	platform.	Although	the	pro-independence	parties	fell	just	short
of	a	majority	of	votes	in	the	regional	elections	of	2015,	they	won	a	majority	of	seats	and	formed	the	new	government.
What	followed	was	a	cat	and	mouse	game	between	the	Catalan	and	Spanish	governments	leading	to	the	attempted
referendum	on	independence	on	1	October	2017,	ruled	out	as	illegal	by	the	Constitutional	Tribunal	and	repressed
with	some	violence	by	the	police.	The	Catalan	government	followed	this	with	a	unilateral	declaration	of	independence
on	27	October	which	led	to	the	intervention	by	the	Spanish	state	and	the	remanding	in	custody	without	bail	of	many
of	its	ministers	and	the	self-imposed	exile	of	others.	The	response	of	the	government,	police	and	judiciary	revealed	a
residue	of	authoritarian	reflexes	among	Spanish	conservative	elites,	in	particular	in	their	application	of	a	repressive
constitutionalism	in	preference	to	conciliation	and	dialogue.
In	the	hope	of	having	made	its	point	that	independence	was	impossible,	the	Spanish	government	held	new	elections
in	Catalonia	on	21	December.	The	results	revealed	flaws	in	both	the	government’s	calculations	and	the	Catalan
independence	movement’s	claim	to	represent	all	Catalans.	The	separatists	won	by	only	two	seats.	In	terms	of
percentages,	the	‘remainers’	scored	the	most	votes,	almost	51%,	while	the	separatists	won	47.5%.	As	in	most
electoral	systems,	the	allocation	of	seats	is	not	based	simply	on	percentages.	In	Spain,	the	rural	and	small	town
votes	count	more,	sometimes	twice,	than	metropolitan	votes.	Catalan	nationalism	is	very	strong	in	the	small
municipalities	and	weaker	in	the	metropolitan	areas	where	dual	identity	is	strong.	This	is	predictable	given	that
migrants	from	other	parts	of	Spain	have	tended	to	settle	in	the	cities	where	more	work	is	available.
But	this	is	not	enough	of	an	explanation.	There	are	many	born	and	bred	in	Catalonia	with	a	strong	Catalan	identity
who	are	against	independence	for	political	reasons,	in	particular	the	belief	that	the	problem	is	not	unity	or
independence	but	socio-economic	and	political.	This	is	a	plural	and	multi-layered	society	and	it	would	be	doing	an
injustice	to	refer	to	a	collective	Catalan	voice.	Yet	the	polarisation	that	has	taken	place	in	Spain	over	the	last	two
years	is	such	that	these	nuances	or	differences	are	lost	in	public	discourse.
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What	has	been	happening	in	Spain	is	part	of	a	process	in	Europe	and	elsewhere	triggered	by	globalisation,
economic	crisis	and	austerity.	Globalisation	began	a	process	in	which	many	states	no	longer	mediated	decisively
between	national	and	international	economies	and	were	less	in	control	of	policy-making.	Political	and	trade	blocs	like
the	EU	provided	a	new	broad	framework	of	trade	and	governance	in	which	old	nation-states	lost	some	authority.	Also
falling	barriers	to	trade	reduced	the	cost	of	being	a	small	state	and	boosted	interest	in	separatism.	Thus	the	re-
emergence	or	strengthening	of	sub-state	nationalism	in	Europe	in	response	to	firstly,	a	weakening	of	state-based
national	identities,	secondly	the	recession	of	2007-8	which	led	to	collective	insecurity	and	the	need	for	new
boundaries	of	national	identity,	and	finally	to	greater	opportunities	for	the	emergence	of	new	nations	within	economic
blocs	such	as	the	EU.
But	this	has	been	countered	by	the	recent	development	of	anti-globalisation	ethnic	nationalisms	in	Europe	and
beyond,	a	far	cry	from	the	civic,	inclusive,	nationalism	of	Catalonia.	Moreover,	the	trust	placed	by	the	Catalan
nationalists	in	the	EU	and	its	plan	for	multilevel	governance	through	the	Europe	of	the	Regions	was	misplaced.	Far
from	supporting	Catalanist	demands,	the	EU	and	several	European	states	responded	to	events	in	Spain	by	declaring
they	were	an	internal	matter,	revealing	their	concern	about	the	threat	of	sub-state	nationalisms	in	Europe.	As	the	ex-
President	of	Catalonia,	Carles	Puigdemont,	recently	said,	the	Europe	of	the	Regions	‘is	a	failure’
There	is	another	international	parallel,	the	channelling	of	socio-economic	and	political	grievances	into	the	politics	of
identity	and	nation.	This	is	a	feature	of	populist	nationalism	everywhere.	By	appealing	across	social	classes	to
national	identity,	it	mobilises	people	against	an	‘Other’,	identified	as	the	source	of	a	range	of	problems.	In	the	Catalan
case,	this	Other	was	defined	at	first	as	simply	Madrid	or	the	Spanish	state.	This	enabled	an	amorphous,	even
contradictory	range	of	aspirations	to	be	projected	on	to	notions	of	independence,	summed	up	in	a	slogan	used
frequently	in	the	discourse,	freedom,	a	much	used	or	abused	term	everywhere.	Then	some	of	the	rhetoric	slipped
into	something	darker,	the	Castilians	or	the	Spanish	as	the	Other,	just	as	right-wing	discourse	in	Spain	descended
into	diatribes	against	the	Catalans	as	an	ethnicity.
With	a	new	more	conciliatory	government	in	place	in	Madrid	and	with	the	restoration	of	the	autonomous	government
in	Barcelona,	the	prospects	for	the	future	relations	between	Spain	and	Catalonia	are	still	unclear.	The	fracture
between	half	of	Catalonia	and	the	rest	of	Spain	now	seems	irreparable.	In	the	absence	of	a	majority	in	the	Congress,
the	new	Spanish	Prime	Minister,	Pedro	Sánchez,	is	likely	to	carry	out	a	holding	operation	in	the	hope	that	support	for
the	Socialists	will	grow	in	time	for	the	new	general	elections	due	in	2020.	In	any	case,	he	has	made	it	clear	all	along
that	he	is	only	interested	in	negotiating	the	terms	of	Catalonia’s	autonomy.	In	contrast,	the	Catalan	coalition
government	is	bound	by	some	of	its	parliamentary	partners	to	continue	pursuing	independence.	Fissures	are
appearing	between	pragmatists	and	unilateralists.	Expect	much	recourse	to	the	politics	of	gesture	on	all	sides.	At
least	in	the	short	and	medium	term,	separatism	remains	a	mirage.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
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